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Before Headstart: The Iowa Station and America's Children, by Hamuton
Cravens. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993. xviii,
327 pp. Illustrations, notes, bibhography, index. $39.95 cloth.
REVIEWED BY JOAN GITTENS, SOUTHWEST STATE UNIVERSITY
Before Headstart tells the story of the University of Iowa's Child Wel-
fare Research Station from the 1920s to the 1950s, the years when the
institute was at its most productive and powerful. Hamilton Cravens
argues that the Iowa Station's uniqueness lay in its double role as
both a shaping force in the field of child development and an insti-
tution that challenged the discipline's main assumptions.
The research center began through the efforts of Cora Bussey
Hillis, a Des Moines woman involved in child welfare concems. An
astute political organizer, Hillis was active at a time when child wel-
fare was considered the natural province of club women like herself.
She was able to tap the energies of the Iowa Mothers' Congress, the
Iowa 'Women's Christian Temperance Union, and the progressive
wing of the Republican Party in her efforts to establish a child wel-
fare research station at an Iowa university.
Once established, the Iowa Station deviated from Hillis's plans
in sigrüficant ways. For one thing, it focused on scholarly research,
and, like other child development centers of the time that were bent
on establishing their scientific and scholarly credentials, it had little
to do with the more activist realm of child welfare practice that Hillis
promoted. Another and defining deviation from her original intent
was the Iowa Station's focus on the normal child at a time when
children were often divided into types, such as "dependent," "delin-
quent," and "feebleminded." The Iowa Station pioneered in the study
of normal children and made its intellectual reputation primarily
through this focus.
The Iowa Station became as famous for challenging the norms of
scientific thinking as it did for studying normal children. In an era
w^hen the orthodox position among child development scientists was
that intelligence was inborn and fixed at birth or affected only mar-
ginally by environment, Iowa Station researchers questioned such
determinism and argued that intervention in a child's life could foster
significant gains in measurable intelligence. The station's Iowa Orphan-
age Studies defied the conventional wisdom that the intelligence of
children placed with foster or adoptive parents would replicate that
of their birth parents. They argued rather that the children's adoptive
environment had a profound influence on their intellectual abilities.
An even more controversial study found that children designated as
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"feebleminded" actually gained significantly in IQ points when they
were placed with older mentally retarded women in the Iowa State
School for the Feebleminded, owing to the increased attention that the
children received compared to their desolate lives in the orphanage.
In addition to their faith in the critical role of nurture over nature,
the Iowa Station scholars differed from other child development ex-
perts in their political involvement. The station's position on the
beneficial effects of environment had profound political implications,
and the Iowa experts were frankly more engaged in shaping policy,
especially educational policy towards children, than other scholars in
their field, who seemed to pride themselves on their detachment from
the world of advocacy. Especially during the New Deal era, scholars
from the Iowa Station had a significant bnpact on programs such as
the inclusion of nursery schools as part of the Federal Emergency
Relief Administration.
By posing the Iowa Station in opposition to the larger field of
child development. Cravens presents a thorough study of this disci-
pline as it developed in a critical time. That makes his work an im-
portant contribution to the history of social science. His research is
careful and extensive, and his intent is to move beyond the merely
institutional history of the organization to set it in its broader national
context. But the rarefied quality of the discipline, which Cravens aptly
describes as "the tiny professional scientific subculture of child devel-
opment" (186), sometimes makes the subject matter of his work dif-
ficult and arcane, unnecessarily so considering the compelling ques-
tions that it raises. Child development experts were so concemed to
disassociate themselves from the practical world of child welfare that
the chapters on the science itself seem detached from any larger reality
than the most academic of exercises, despite the fact that the intellec-
tual stakes—the implications for the view of human nature and its
capacities—were clearly very high. The second half of the book, where
Cravens demonstrates the way the Iowa Station deviated from the
norm and made its academic work pertinent to the larger society, is
the more engaging part of the story.
Cravens sees the Iowa Station as a forerunner of shifting American
values, in that its research tended to emphasize the individual child
rather than children in groups. According to Cravens, American social
thought in the first half of the twentieth century was notable for its
tendency to classify, to see individuals only as part of larger units such
as family, gender, or ethnic group. Conversely, the second half of the
twentieüi century has focused almost exclusively on the individual.
This is an interesting contention, but Cravens never really develops
the view, asserting it as an accepted assessment of the intellectual
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climate of the time rather than proving it to potentially skeptical
readers.
The book is most successful in describing the development of the
study of child development and the Iowa Station's role in that field,
least successful in cormecting this academic history to the broader
culture of the time.
Choosing Truman: The Democratic Convention of 1944, by Robert H.
FerreU. Columbia: Urüversity of Missouri Press, 1994. xiii, 137 pp.
Notes, bibliography, index. $24.95 cloth.
REVIEWED BY RICHARD S. KIRKENDALL, UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON
This impressively researched, well-written, and forcefully argued book
concentrates on the most important decision made by the Democratic
Party in 1944. In doing so, it deals with the major turning point in the
career of a prominent Iowan, Henry A. Wallace. The decision con-
cemed the selection of the vice-presidential candidate. What made it
so important is that the person chosen soon became president—and
at a crucial time.
Up to this point of decision, Wallace had enjoyed one successif ter
another. After editing Wallaces' Farmer and founding what became the
nation's leading seed com company, he served two terms as secretary
of agriculture and one as vice-president. By 1944, many people re-
garded him as the person who should succeed Franklin Roosevelt.
But the Democrats chose Truman for the vice-presidency that year.
He became president in 1945, fired Wallace from the cabinet in 1946,
and defeated him for the presidency two years later. Soon after that
staggering defeat, the Iowa native, then living in New York, dropped
out of politics.
Why did Wallace's life take this tum in 1944? Robert Ferrell
argues that the tum was engineered by party leaders, most notably
Robert Hannegan, the chair of the Democratic National Committee,
and Edwin Pauley, the committee's treasurer. They waged a successful
campaign to persuade Roosevelt that Wallace would hurt the ticket
and then to convince convention delegates that Roosevelt believed this
and thus wanted Truman. Their motive was to defeat Wallace, whom
they cor\sidered strange, a poor politician, too liberal, and unfit to
succeed the sick Roosevelt in the White House. They looked at several
altematives before settling on Truman.
Although Ferrell's account significantly advances our under-
standing of the 1944 decision, several features seem imsatisfactory.

